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With the compile time check located immediately above the
cred_has_capability() function ensuring that we will notice if the
capability set grows beyond 63 capabilities, we can safely remove
the BUG() call from the cred_has_capability().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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There was a typo, likely a cut-n-paste bug, where we were checking for
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY instead of SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2.
Fixes: 5473a722f782 ("selinux: add support for BPF token access control")
Reported-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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BPF token support was introduced to allow a privileged process to delegate
limited BPF functionality—such as map creation and program loading—to
an unprivileged process:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231130185229.2688956-1-andrii@kernel.org/
This patch adds SELinux support for controlling BPF token access. With
this change, SELinux policies can now enforce constraints on BPF token
usage based on both the delegating (privileged) process and the recipient
(unprivileged) process.
Supported operations currently include:
- map_create
- prog_load
High-level workflow:
1. An unprivileged process creates a VFS context via `fsopen()` and
obtains a file descriptor.
2. This descriptor is passed to a privileged process, which configures
BPF token delegation options and mounts a BPF filesystem.
3. SELinux records the `creator_sid` of the privileged process during
mount setup.
4. The unprivileged process then uses this BPF fs mount to create a
token and attach it to subsequent BPF syscalls.
5. During verification of `map_create` and `prog_load`, SELinux uses
`creator_sid` and the current SID to check policy permissions via:
avc_has_perm(creator_sid, current_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL);
The implementation introduces two new permissions:
- map_create_as
- prog_load_as
At token creation time, SELinux verifies that the current process has the
appropriate `*_as` permission (depending on the `allowed_cmds` value in
the bpf_token) to act on behalf of the `creator_sid`.
Example SELinux policy:
allow test_bpf_t self:bpf {
map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run
map_create_as prog_load_as
};
Additionally, a new policy capability bpf_token_perms is added to ensure
backward compatibility. If disabled, previous behavior ((checks based on
current process SID)) is preserved.
Signed-off-by: Eric Suen <ericsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject tweaks, whitespace tweaks, line length tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Move the selinux_blob_sizes struct so it adjacent to the rest of the
SELinux initialization code and not in the middle of the LSM hook
callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull persistent dentry infrastructure and conversion from Al Viro:
"Some filesystems use a kinda-sorta controlled dentry refcount leak to
pin dentries of created objects in dcache (and undo it when removing
those). A reference is grabbed and not released, but it's not actually
_stored_ anywhere.
That works, but it's hard to follow and verify; among other things, we
have no way to tell _which_ of the increments is intended to be an
unpaired one. Worse, on removal we need to decide whether the
reference had already been dropped, which can be non-trivial if that
removal is on umount and we need to figure out if this dentry is
pinned due to e.g. unlink() not done. Usually that is handled by using
kill_litter_super() as ->kill_sb(), but there are open-coded special
cases of the same (consider e.g. /proc/self).
Things get simpler if we introduce a new dentry flag
(DCACHE_PERSISTENT) marking those "leaked" dentries. Having it set
claims responsibility for +1 in refcount.
The end result this series is aiming for:
- get these unbalanced dget() and dput() replaced with new primitives
that would, in addition to adjusting refcount, set and clear
persistency flag.
- instead of having kill_litter_super() mess with removing the
remaining "leaked" references (e.g. for all tmpfs files that hadn't
been removed prior to umount), have the regular
shrink_dcache_for_umount() strip DCACHE_PERSISTENT of all dentries,
dropping the corresponding reference if it had been set. After that
kill_litter_super() becomes an equivalent of kill_anon_super().
Doing that in a single step is not feasible - it would affect too many
places in too many filesystems. It has to be split into a series.
This work has really started early in 2024; quite a few preliminary
pieces have already gone into mainline. This chunk is finally getting
to the meat of that stuff - infrastructure and most of the conversions
to it.
Some pieces are still sitting in the local branches, but the bulk of
that stuff is here"
* tag 'pull-persistency' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (54 commits)
d_make_discardable(): warn if given a non-persistent dentry
kill securityfs_recursive_remove()
convert securityfs
get rid of kill_litter_super()
convert rust_binderfs
convert nfsctl
convert rpc_pipefs
convert hypfs
hypfs: swich hypfs_create_u64() to returning int
hypfs: switch hypfs_create_str() to returning int
hypfs: don't pin dentries twice
convert gadgetfs
gadgetfs: switch to simple_remove_by_name()
convert functionfs
functionfs: switch to simple_remove_by_name()
functionfs: fix the open/removal races
functionfs: need to cancel ->reset_work in ->kill_sb()
functionfs: don't bother with ffs->ref in ffs_data_{opened,closed}()
functionfs: don't abuse ffs_data_closed() on fs shutdown
convert selinuxfs
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes:
- defer credentials checking from the bprm_check_security hook to the
bprm_creds_from_file security hook
- properly ignore IMA policy rules based on undefined SELinux labels
IMA policy rule extensions:
- extend IMA to limit including file hashes in the audit logs
(dont_audit action)
- define a new filesystem subtype policy option (fs_subtype)
Misc:
- extend IMA to support in-kernel module decompression by deferring
the IMA signature verification in kernel_read_file() to after the
kernel module is decompressed"
* tag 'integrity-v6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
ima: Access decompressed kernel module to verify appended signature
ima: add fs_subtype condition for distinguishing FUSE instances
ima: add dont_audit action to suppress audit actions
ima: Attach CREDS_CHECK IMA hook to bprm_creds_from_file LSM hook
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Improve the granularity of SELinux labeling for memfd files
Currently when creating a memfd file, SELinux treats it the same as
any other tmpfs, or hugetlbfs, file. While simple, the drawback is
that it is not possible to differentiate between memfd and tmpfs
files.
This adds a call to the security_inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
and wires up SELinux to provide a set of memfd specific access
controls, including the ability to control the execution of memfds.
As usual, the commit message has more information.
- Improve the SELinux AVC lookup performance
Adopt MurmurHash3 for the SELinux AVC hash function instead of the
custom hash function currently used. MurmurHash3 is already used for
the SELinux access vector table so the impact to the code is minimal,
and performance tests have shown improvements in both hash
distribution and latency.
See the commit message for the performance measurments.
- Introduce a Kconfig option for the SELinux AVC bucket/slot size
While we have the ability to grow the number of AVC hash buckets
today, the size of the buckets (slot size) is fixed at 512. This pull
request makes that slot size configurable at build time through a new
Kconfig knob, CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20251201' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: improve bucket distribution uniformity of avc_hash()
selinux: Move avtab_hash() to a shared location for future reuse
selinux: Introduce a new config to make avc cache slot size adjustable
memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security_anon()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
- Rework the LSM initialization code
What started as a "quick" patch to enable a notification event once
all of the individual LSMs were initialized, snowballed a bit into a
30+ patch patchset when everything was done. Most of the patches, and
diffstat, is due to splitting out the initialization code into
security/lsm_init.c and cleaning up some of the mess that was there.
While not strictly necessary, it does cleanup the code signficantly,
and hopefully makes the upkeep a bit easier in the future.
Aside from the new LSM_STARTED_ALL notification, these changes also
ensure that individual LSM initcalls are only called when the LSM is
enabled at boot time. There should be a minor reduction in boot times
for those who build multiple LSMs into their kernels, but only enable
a subset at boot.
It is worth mentioning that nothing at present makes use of the
LSM_STARTED_ALL notification, but there is work in progress which is
dependent upon LSM_STARTED_ALL.
- Make better use of the seq_put*() helpers in device_cgroup
* tag 'lsm-pr-20251201' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (36 commits)
lsm: use unrcu_pointer() for current->cred in security_init()
device_cgroup: Refactor devcgroup_seq_show to use seq_put* helpers
lsm: add a LSM_STARTED_ALL notification event
lsm: consolidate all of the LSM framework initcalls
selinux: move initcalls to the LSM framework
ima,evm: move initcalls to the LSM framework
lockdown: move initcalls to the LSM framework
apparmor: move initcalls to the LSM framework
safesetid: move initcalls to the LSM framework
tomoyo: move initcalls to the LSM framework
smack: move initcalls to the LSM framework
ipe: move initcalls to the LSM framework
loadpin: move initcalls to the LSM framework
lsm: introduce an initcall mechanism into the LSM framework
lsm: group lsm_order_parse() with the other lsm_order_*() functions
lsm: output available LSMs when debugging
lsm: cleanup the debug and console output in lsm_init.c
lsm: add/tweak function header comment blocks in lsm_init.c
lsm: fold lsm_init_ordered() into security_init()
lsm: cleanup initialize_lsm() and rename to lsm_init_single()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull directory locking updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work to add centralized APIs for directory locking
operations.
This series is part of a larger effort to change directory operation
locking to allow multiple concurrent operations in a directory. The
ultimate goal is to lock the target dentry(s) rather than the whole
parent directory.
To help with changing the locking protocol, this series centralizes
locking and lookup in new helper functions. The helpers establish a
pattern where it is the dentry that is being locked and unlocked
(currently the lock is held on dentry->d_parent->d_inode, but that can
change in the future).
This also changes vfs_mkdir() to unlock the parent on failure, as well
as dput()ing the dentry. This allows end_creating() to only require
the target dentry (which may be IS_ERR() after vfs_mkdir()), not the
parent"
* tag 'vfs-6.19-rc1.directory.locking' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
nfsd: fix end_creating() conversion
VFS: introduce end_creating_keep()
VFS: change vfs_mkdir() to unlock on failure.
ecryptfs: use new start_creating/start_removing APIs
Add start_renaming_two_dentries()
VFS/ovl/smb: introduce start_renaming_dentry()
VFS/nfsd/ovl: introduce start_renaming() and end_renaming()
VFS: add start_creating_killable() and start_removing_killable()
VFS: introduce start_removing_dentry()
smb/server: use end_removing_noperm for for target of smb2_create_link()
VFS: introduce start_creating_noperm() and start_removing_noperm()
VFS/nfsd/cachefiles/ovl: introduce start_removing() and end_removing()
VFS/nfsd/cachefiles/ovl: add start_creating() and end_creating()
VFS: tidy up do_unlinkat()
VFS: introduce start_dirop() and end_dirop()
debugfs: rename end_creating() to debugfs_end_creating()
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Along with the renaming from task_security_struct to cred_security_struct,
rename the local variables to "crsec" from "tsec". This both fits with
existing conventions and helps distinguish between task and cred related
variables.
No functional changes.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The avdcache is meant to be per-task; move it to a new
task_security_struct that is duplicated per-task.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5d7ddc59b3d89b724a5aa8f30d0db94ff8d2d93f ("selinux: reduce path walk overhead")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: line length fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Before Linux had cred structures, the SELinux task_security_struct was
per-task and although the structure was switched to being per-cred
long ago, the name was never updated. This change renames it to
cred_security_struct to avoid confusion and pave the way for the
introduction of an actual per-task security structure for SELinux. No
functional change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, when in-kernel module decompression (CONFIG_MODULE_DECOMPRESS)
is enabled, IMA has no way to verify the appended module signature as it
can't decompress the module.
Define a new kernel_read_file_id enumerate READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED so
IMA can calculate the compressed kernel module data hash on
READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED and defer appraising/measuring it until on
READING_MODULE when the module has been decompressed.
Before enabling in-kernel module decompression, a kernel module in
initramfs can still be loaded with ima_policy=secure_boot. So adjust the
kernel module rule in secure_boot policy to allow either an IMA
signature OR an appended signature i.e. to use
"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig".
Reported-by: Karel Srot <ksrot@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Tree has invariant part + two subtrees that get replaced upon each
policy load. Invariant parts stay for the lifetime of filesystem,
these two subdirs - from policy load to policy load (serialized
on lock_rename(root, ...)).
All object creations are via d_alloc_name()+d_add() inside selinuxfs,
all removals are via simple_recursive_removal().
Turn those d_add() into d_make_persistent()+dput() and that's mostly it.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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allocating dentry after the inode has been set up reduces the amount
of boilerplate - "attach this inode under that name and this parent
or drop inode in case of failure" simplifies quite a few places.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Don't bother to store the dentry of /policy_capabilities - it belongs
to invariant part of tree and we only use it to populate that directory,
so there's no reason to keep it around afterwards.
Same situation as with /avc, /ss, etc. There are two directories that
get replaced on policy load - /class and /booleans. These we need to
stash (and update the pointers on policy reload); /policy_capabilities
is not in the same boat.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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A few callers want to lock for a rename and already have both dentries.
Also debugfs does want to perform a lookup but doesn't want permission
checking, so start_renaming_dentry() cannot be used.
This patch introduces start_renaming_two_dentries() which is given both
dentries. debugfs performs one lookup itself. As it will only continue
with a negative dentry and as those cannot be renamed or unlinked, it is
safe to do the lookup before getting the rename locks.
overlayfs uses start_renaming_two_dentries() in three places and selinux
uses it twice in sel_make_policy_nodes().
In sel_make_policy_nodes() we now lock for rename twice instead of just
once so the combined operation is no longer atomic w.r.t the parent
directory locks. As selinux_state.policy_mutex is held across the whole
operation this does not open up any interesting races.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113002050.676694-13-neilb@ownmail.net
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Reuse the already implemented MurmurHash3 algorithm. Under heavy stress
testing (on an 8-core system sustaining over 50,000 authentication events
per second), sample once per second and take the mean of 1800 samples:
1. Bucket utilization rate and length of longest chain
+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| | bucket utilization rate / longest chain |
| +--------------------+--------------------+
| | no-patch | with-patch |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 512 nodes, 512 buckets | 52.5%/7.5 | 60.2%/5.7 |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 1024 nodes, 512 buckets | 68.9%/12.1 | 80.2%/9.7 |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 2048 nodes, 512 buckets | 83.7%/19.4 | 93.4%/16.3 |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 8192 nodes, 8192 buckets | 49.5%/11.4 | 60.3%/7.4 |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
2. avc_search_node latency (total latency of hash operation and table
lookup)
+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| | latency of function avc_search_node |
| +--------------------+--------------------+
| | no-patch | with-patch |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 512 nodes, 512 buckets | 87ns | 84ns |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 1024 nodes, 512 buckets | 97ns | 96ns |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 2048 nodes, 512 buckets | 118ns | 113ns |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 8192 nodes, 8192 buckets | 106ns | 99ns |
+--------------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
Although MurmurHash3 has higher overhead than the bitwise operations in
the original algorithm, the data shows that the MurmurHash3 achieves
better distribution, reducing average lookup time. Consequently, the
total latency of hashing and table lookup is lower than before.
Signed-off-by: Hongru Zhang <zhanghongru@xiaomi.com>
[PM: whitespace fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This is a preparation patch, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Hongru Zhang <zhanghongru@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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On mobile device high-load situations, permission check can happen
more than 90,000/s (8 core system). With default 512 cache nodes
configuration, avc cache miss happens more often and occasionally
leads to long time (>2ms) irqs off on both big and little cores,
which decreases system real-time capability.
An actual call stack is as follows:
=> avc_compute_av
=> avc_perm_nonode
=> avc_has_perm_noaudit
=> selinux_capable
=> security_capable
=> capable
=> __sched_setscheduler
=> do_sched_setscheduler
=> __arm64_sys_sched_setscheduler
=> invoke_syscall
=> el0_svc_common
=> do_el0_svc
=> el0_svc
=> el0t_64_sync_handler
=> el0t_64_sync
Although we can expand avc nodes through /sys/fs/selinux/cache_threshold
to mitigate long time irqs off, hash conflicts make the bucket average
length longer because of the fixed size of cache slots, leading to
avc_search_node() latency increase.
So introduce a new config to make avc cache slot size also configurable,
and with fine tuning, we can mitigate long time irqs off with slightly
avc_search_node() performance regression.
Theoretically, the main overhead is memory consumption.
Signed-off-by: Hongru Zhang <zhanghongru@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Prior to this change, no security hooks were called at the creation of a
memfd file. It means that, for SELinux as an example, it will receive
the default type of the filesystem that backs the in-memory inode. In
most cases, that would be tmpfs, but if MFD_HUGETLB is passed, it will
be hugetlbfs. Both can be considered implementation details of memfd.
It also means that it is not possible to differentiate between a file
coming from memfd_create and a file coming from a standard tmpfs mount
point.
Additionally, no permission is validated at creation, which differs from
the similar memfd_secret syscall.
Call security_inode_init_security_anon during creation. This ensures
that the file is setup similarly to other anonymous inodes. On SELinux,
it means that the file will receive the security context of its task.
The ability to limit fexecve on memfd has been of interest to avoid
potential pitfalls where /proc/self/exe or similar would be executed
[1][2]. Reuse the "execute_no_trans" and "entrypoint" access vectors,
similarly to the file class. These access vectors may not make sense for
the existing "anon_inode" class. Therefore, define and assign a new
class "memfd_file" to support such access vectors.
Guard these changes behind a new policy capability named "memfd_class".
[1] https://crbug.com/1305267
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux currently has a number of initcalls so we've created a new
function, selinux_initcall(), which wraps all of these initcalls so
that we have a single initcall function that can be registered with the
LSM framework.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Reduce the duplication between the lsm_id struct and the DEFINE_LSM()
definition by linking the lsm_id struct directly into the individual
LSM's DEFINE_LSM() instance.
Linking the lsm_id into the LSM definition also allows us to simplify
the security_add_hooks() function by removing the code which populates
the lsm_idlist[] array and moving it into the normal LSM startup code
where the LSM list is parsed and the individual LSMs are enabled,
making for a cleaner implementation with less overhead at boot.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Pull d_name audit update from Al Viro:
"Simplifying ->d_name audits, easy part.
Turn dentry->d_name into an anon union of const struct qsrt (d_name
itself) and a writable alias (__d_name).
With constification of some struct qstr * arguments of functions that
get &dentry->d_name passed to them, that ends up with all
modifications provably done only in fs/dcache.c (and a fairly small
part of it).
Any new places doing modifications will be easy to find - grep for
__d_name will suffice"
* tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make it easier to catch those who try to modify ->d_name
generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument
afs_dir_search: constify qstr argument
afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): constify qstr argument
exfat_find(): constify qstr argument
security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the management of the LSM BPF security blobs into the framework
In order to enable multiple LSMs we need to allocate and free the
various security blobs in the LSM framework and not the individual
LSMs as they would end up stepping all over each other.
- Leverage the lsm_bdev_alloc() helper in lsm_bdev_alloc()
Make better use of our existing helper functions to reduce some code
duplication.
- Update the Rust cred code to use 'sync::aref'
Part of a larger effort to move the Rust code over to the 'sync'
module.
- Make CONFIG_LSM dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY
As the CONFIG_LSM Kconfig setting is an ordered list of the LSMs to
enable a boot, it obviously doesn't make much sense to enable this
when CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled.
- Update the LSM and CREDENTIALS sections in MAINTAINERS with Rusty
bits
Add the Rust helper files to the associated LSM and CREDENTIALS
entries int the MAINTAINERS file. We're trying to improve the
communication between the two groups and making sure we're all aware
of what is going on via cross-posting to the relevant lists is a good
way to start.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: CONFIG_LSM can depend on CONFIG_SECURITY
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the CREDENTIALS section
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the LSM section
rust,cred: update AlwaysRefCounted import to sync::aref
security: use umax() to improve code
lsm,selinux: Add LSM blob support for BPF objects
lsm: use lsm_blob_alloc() in lsm_bdev_alloc()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Support per-file labeling for functionfs
Both genfscon and user defined labeling methods are supported. This
should help users who want to provide separation between the control
endpoint file, "ep0", and other endpoints.
- Remove our use of get_zeroed_page() in sel_read_bool()
Update sel_read_bool() to use a four byte stack buffer instead of a
memory page fetched via get_zeroed_page(), and fix a memory in the
process.
Needless to say we should have done this a long time ago, but it was
in a very old chunk of code that "just worked" and I don't think
anyone had taken a real look at it in many years.
- Better use of the netdev skb/sock helper functions
Convert a sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk) into a skb_to_full_sk(skb) call.
- Remove some old, dead, and/or redundant code
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
selinux: fix sel_read_bool() allocation and error handling
selinux: Remove redundant __GFP_NOWARN
selinux: use a consistent method to get full socket from skb
selinux: Remove unused function selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
- Proper audit support for multiple LSMs
As the audit subsystem predated the work to enable multiple LSMs,
some additional work was needed to support logging the different LSM
labels for the subjects/tasks and objects on the system. Casey's
patches add new auxillary records for subjects and objects that
convey the additional labels.
- Ensure fanotify audit events are always generated
Generally speaking security relevant subsystems always generate audit
events, unless explicitly ignored. However, up to this point fanotify
events had been ignored by default, but starting with this pull
request fanotify follows convention and generates audit events by
default.
- Replace an instance of strcpy() with strscpy()
- Minor indentation, style, and comment fixes
* tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: fix skb leak when audit rate limit is exceeded
audit: init ab->skb_list earlier in audit_buffer_alloc()
audit: add record for multiple object contexts
audit: add record for multiple task security contexts
lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection
audit: create audit_stamp structure
audit: add a missing tab
audit: record fanotify event regardless of presence of rules
audit: fix typo in auditfilter.c comment
audit: Replace deprecated strcpy() with strscpy()
audit: fix indentation in audit_log_exit()
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Nothing outside of fs/dcache.c has any business modifying
dentry names; passing &dentry->d_name as an argument should
have that argument declared as a const pointer.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # smack part
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs
files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new
functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a
per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default
endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional
usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a
system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not
likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch -
the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain
existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.
Signed-off-by: Neill Kapron <nkapron@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: trim changelog, apply boolean logic fixup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Switch sel_read_bool() from using get_zeroed_page() and free_page()
to a stack-allocated buffer. This also fixes a memory leak in the
error path when security_get_bool_value() returns an error.
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-2-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak, audit example readability indents]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with a list of
skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as
there's no guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing
the stamp associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create
auxiliary records as have been added to the list. Functions are
created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record the
"subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based on a
subject security context.
Refactor audit_log_task_context(), creating a new audit_log_subj_ctx().
This is used in netlabel auditing to provide multiple subject security
contexts as necessary.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak, audit example readability indents]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit 16f5dfbc851b ("gfp: include __GFP_NOWARN in GFP_NOWAIT")
made GFP_NOWAIT implicitly include __GFP_NOWARN.
Therefore, explicit __GFP_NOWARN combined with GFP_NOWAIT
(e.g., `GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN`) is now redundant. Let's clean
up these redundant flags across subsystems.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Qianfeng Rong <rongqianfeng@vivo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed horizontal spacing / alignment, line wraps]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces LSM blob support for BPF maps, programs, and
tokens to enable LSM stacking and multiplexing of LSM modules that
govern BPF objects. Additionally, the existing BPF hooks used by
SELinux have been updated to utilize the new blob infrastructure,
removing the assumption of exclusive ownership of the security
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: dropped local variable init, style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In order to maintain code consistency and readability,
skb_to_full_sk() is used to get full socket from skb.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This is unused since commit a3d3043ef24a ("selinux: get netif_wildcard
policycap from policy instead of cache").
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Introduce the concept of a SELinux "neveraudit" type which prevents
all auditing of the given type/domain.
Taken by itself, the benefit of marking a SELinux domain with the
"neveraudit" tag is likely not very interesting, especially given the
significant overlap with the "dontaudit" tag.
However, given that the "neveraudit" tag applies to *all* auditing of
the tagged domain, we can do some fairly interesting optimizations
when a SELinux domain is marked as both "permissive" and "dontaudit"
(think of the unconfined_t domain).
While this pull request includes optimized inode permission and
getattr hooks, these optimizations require SELinux policy changes,
therefore the improvements may not be visible on standard downstream
Linux distos for a period of time.
- Continue the deprecation process of /sys/fs/selinux/user.
After removing the associated userspace code in 2020, we marked the
/sys/fs/selinux/user interface as deprecated in Linux v6.13 with
pr_warn() and the usual documention update.
This adds a five second sleep after the pr_warn(), following a
previous deprecation process pattern that has worked well for us in
the past in helping identify any existing users that we haven't yet
reached.
- Add a __GFP_NOWARN flag to our initial hash table allocation.
Fuzzers such a syzbot often attempt abnormally large SELinux policy
loads, which the SELinux code gracefully handles by checking for
allocation failures, but not before the allocator emits a warning
which causes the automated fuzzing to flag this as an error and
report it to the list. While we want to continue to support the work
done by the fuzzing teams, we want to focus on proper issues and not
an error case that is already handled safely. Add a NOWARN flag to
quiet the allocator and prevent syzbot from tripping on this again.
- Remove some unnecessary selinuxfs cleanup code, courtesy of Al.
- Update the SELinux in-kernel documentation with pointers to
additional information.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: don't bother with selinuxfs_info_free() on failures
selinux: add __GFP_NOWARN to hashtab_init() allocations
selinux: optimize selinux_inode_getattr/permission() based on neveraudit|permissive
selinux: introduce neveraudit types
documentation: add links to SELinux resources
selinux: add a 5 second sleep to /sys/fs/selinux/user
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull fileattr updates from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces the new file_getattr() and file_setattr() system calls
after lengthy discussions.
Both system calls serve as successors and extensible companions to
the FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR system calls which have
started to show their age in addition to being named in a way that
makes it easy to conflate them with extended attribute related
operations.
These syscalls allow userspace to set filesystem inode attributes on
special files. One of the usage examples is the XFS quota projects.
XFS has project quotas which could be attached to a directory. All new
inodes in these directories inherit project ID set on parent
directory.
The project is created from userspace by opening and calling
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR on each inode. This is not possible for special
files such as FIFO, SOCK, BLK etc. Therefore, some inodes are left
with empty project ID. Those inodes then are not shown in the quota
accounting but still exist in the directory. This is not critical but
in the case when special files are created in the directory with
already existing project quota, these new inodes inherit extended
attributes. This creates a mix of special files with and without
attributes. Moreover, special files with attributes don't have a
possibility to become clear or change the attributes. This, in turn,
prevents userspace from re-creating quota project on these existing
files.
In addition, these new system calls allow the implementation of
additional attributes that we couldn't or didn't want to fit into the
legacy ioctls anymore"
* tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.fileattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: tighten a sanity check in file_attr_to_fileattr()
tree-wide: s/struct fileattr/struct file_kattr/g
fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls
fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr()
fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOTSUPP
selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks
lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
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Now that we expose struct file_attr as our uapi struct rename all the
internal struct to struct file_kattr to clearly communicate that it is a
kernel internal struct. This is similar to struct mount_{k}attr and
others.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250703-restlaufzeit-baurecht-9ed44552b481@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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These hooks are called on inode extended attribute retrieval/change.
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-3-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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