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2026-04-01ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signaturesMimi Zohar1-12/+10
Defining a policy rule with the "appraise_type=imasig" option allows either v2 or v3 signatures. Defining an IMA appraise rule with the "appraise_type=sigv3" option requires a file sigv3 signature. Define a new appraise type: IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED Example: appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3 Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2026-02-21Convert more 'alloc_obj' cases to default GFP_KERNEL argumentsLinus Torvalds1-2/+1
This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next line. Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial. So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed' scripts. The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want whitespace cleanup anyway. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-21Convert 'alloc_flex' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argumentLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
This is the exact same thing as the 'alloc_obj()' version, only much smaller because there are a lot fewer users of the *alloc_flex() interface. As with alloc_obj() version, this was done entirely with mindless brute force, using the same script, except using 'flex' in the pattern rather than 'objs*'. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-21Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argumentLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' | xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/' to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL argument to just drop that argument. Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered: they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically. For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate conversion. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-21treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar typesKees Cook1-4/+4
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union object instances: Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...) Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...) Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...) (where TYPE may also be *VAR) The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning "TYPE *". Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-11-21ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()Zhao Yipeng1-1/+1
In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2025-11-19ima: Access decompressed kernel module to verify appended signatureCoiby Xu1-1/+2
Currently, when in-kernel module decompression (CONFIG_MODULE_DECOMPRESS) is enabled, IMA has no way to verify the appended module signature as it can't decompress the module. Define a new kernel_read_file_id enumerate READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED so IMA can calculate the compressed kernel module data hash on READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED and defer appraising/measuring it until on READING_MODULE when the module has been decompressed. Before enabling in-kernel module decompression, a kernel module in initramfs can still be loaded with ima_policy=secure_boot. So adjust the kernel module rule in secure_boot policy to allow either an IMA signature OR an appended signature i.e. to use "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig". Reported-by: Karel Srot <ksrot@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2025-10-16ima: add fs_subtype condition for distinguishing FUSE instancesJann Horn1-4/+39
Linux systems often use FUSE for several different purposes, where the contents of some FUSE instances can be of more interest for auditing than others. Allow distinguishing between them based on the filesystem subtype (s_subtype) using the new condition "fs_subtype". The subtype string is supplied by userspace FUSE daemons when a FUSE connection is initialized, so policy authors who want to filter based on subtype need to ensure that FUSE mount operations are sufficiently audited or restricted. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2025-10-16ima: add dont_audit action to suppress audit actionsJann Horn1-1/+13
"measure", "appraise" and "hash" actions all have corresponding "dont_*" actions, but "audit" currently lacks that. This means it is not currently possible to have a policy that audits everything by default, but excludes specific cases. This seems to have been an oversight back when the "audit" action was added. Add a corresponding "dont_audit" action to enable such uses. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2025-01-03ima: ignore suffixed policy rule commentsMimi Zohar1-1/+1
Lines beginning with '#' in the IMA policy are comments and are ignored. Instead of placing the rule and comment on separate lines, allow the comment to be suffixed to the IMA policy rule. Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2025-01-03ima: limit the builtin 'tcb' dont_measure tmpfs policy ruleMimi Zohar1-1/+2
With a custom policy similar to the builtin IMA 'tcb' policy [1], arch specific policy, and a kexec boot command line measurement policy rule, the kexec boot command line is not measured due to the dont_measure tmpfs rule. Limit the builtin 'tcb' dont_measure tmpfs policy rule to just the "func=FILE_CHECK" hook. Depending on the end users security threat model, a custom policy might not even include this dont_measure tmpfs rule. Note: as a result of this policy rule change, other measurements might also be included in the IMA-measurement list that previously weren't included. [1] https://ima-doc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ima-policy.html#ima-tcb Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-11-26ima: uncover hidden variable in ima_match_rules()Casey Schaufler1-4/+5
The variable name "prop" is inadvertently used twice in ima_match_rules(), resulting in incorrect use of the local variable when the function parameter should have been. Rename the local variable and correct the use of the parameter. Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> [PM: subj tweak, Roberto's ACK] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-11lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecidCasey Schaufler1-2/+1
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop(). Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-11lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecidCasey Schaufler1-8/+6
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible security data for possible reporting. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-11lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_matchCasey Schaufler1-4/+7
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init() fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series. At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-06-13ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical sectionGUO Zihua1-6/+9
A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSMRoberto Sassu1-1/+1
Make the 'ima' LSM independent from the 'integrity' LSM by introducing IMA own integrity metadata (ima_iint_cache structure, with IMA-specific fields from the integrity_iint_cache structure), and by managing it directly from the 'ima' LSM. Create ima_iint.c and introduce the same integrity metadata management functions found in iint.c (renamed with ima_). However, instead of putting metadata in an rbtree, reserve space from IMA in the inode security blob for a pointer, and introduce the ima_inode_set_iint()/ima_inode_get_iint() primitives to store/retrieve that pointer. This improves search time from logarithmic to constant. Consequently, don't include the inode pointer as field in the ima_iint_cache structure, since the association with the inode is clear. Since the inode field is missing in ima_iint_cache, pass the extra inode parameter to ima_get_verity_digest(). Prefer storing the pointer instead of the entire ima_iint_cache structure, to avoid too much memory pressure. Use the same mechanism as before, a cache named ima_iint_cache (renamed from iint_cache), to quickly allocate a new ima_iint_cache structure when requested by the IMA policy. Create the new ima_iint_cache in ima_iintcache_init(), called by init_ima_lsm(), during the initialization of the 'ima' LSM. And, register ima_inode_free_security() to free the ima_iint_cache structure, if exists. Replace integrity_iint_cache with ima_iint_cache in various places of the IMA code. Also, replace integrity_inode_get() and integrity_iint_find(), respectively with ima_inode_get() and ima_iint_find(). Finally, move the remaining IMA-specific flags to security/integrity/ima/ima.h, since they are now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-30Merge tag 'integrity-v6.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-12/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: - With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring, directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the "machine" keyrings. With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself be signed. [ As commit 099f26f22f58 was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies may break userspace expectations. ] - IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules, Power kernel image). Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed - Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update * tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig
2023-08-18integrity: Annotate struct ima_rule_opt_list with __counted_byKees Cook1-2/+2
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family functions). As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct ima_rule_opt_list. Additionally, since the element count member must be set before accessing the annotated flexible array member, move its initialization earlier. [1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817210327.never.598-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-08-01integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisalEric Snowberg1-12/+5
Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures. An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-06-06ima: Fix build warningsRoberto Sassu1-1/+2
Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for ima_collect_modsig(), ima_match_policy() and ima_parse_add_rule(). Fixes: 15588227e086 ("ima: Collect modsig") # v5.4+ Fixes: 2fe5d6def167 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") # v5.14+ Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-02-22Merge tag 'integrity-v6.3' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar: "One doc and one code cleanup, and two bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook evm: call dump_security_xattr() in all cases to remove code duplication ima: fix ima_delete_rules() kernel-doc warning ima: return IMA digest value only when IMA_COLLECTED flag is set ima: fix error handling logic when file measurement failed
2023-01-31ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hookRoberto Sassu1-0/+4
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") caused ima_file_mmap() to receive the protections requested by the application and not those applied by the kernel. After restoring the original MMAP_CHECK behavior, existing attestation servers might be broken due to not being ready to handle new entries (previously missing) in the IMA measurement list. Restore the original correct MMAP_CHECK behavior, instead of keeping the current buggy one and introducing a new hook with the correct behavior. Otherwise, there would have been the risk of IMA users not noticing the problem at all, as they would actively have to update the IMA policy, to switch to the correct behavior. Also, introduce the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook to keep the current behavior, so that IMA users could easily fix a broken attestation server, although this approach is discouraged due to potentially missing measurements. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-01-19fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner1-3/+2
Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Remove legacy file_mnt_user_ns() and mnt_user_ns(). Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-19fs: port xattr to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner1-5/+6
Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-18ima: fix ima_delete_rules() kernel-doc warningRandy Dunlap1-1/+2
Use correct kernel-doc syntax in the function description to prevent a kernel-doc warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1964: warning: expecting prototype for ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in(). Prototype was for ima_delete_rules() instead Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-12-21Merge tag 'fs.vfsuid.ima.v6.2-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+24
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping Pull vfsuid cleanup from Christian Brauner: "This moves the ima specific vfs{g,u}id_t comparison helpers out of the header and into the one file in ima where they are used. We shouldn't incentivize people to use them by placing them into the header. As discussed and suggested by Linus in [1] let's just define them locally in the one file in ima where they are used" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wj4BpEwUd=OkTv1F9uykvSrsBNZJVHMp+p_+e2kiV71_A@mail.gmail.com [1] * tag 'fs.vfsuid.ima.v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: mnt_idmapping: move ima-only helpers to ima
2022-12-13Merge tag 'integrity-v6.2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-16/+35
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes: Cleanup: - Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip Bug fixes: - Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data - Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules (-ESTALE) - IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths - CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed" * tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields() integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash() ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match() ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
2022-12-13mnt_idmapping: move ima-only helpers to imaChristian Brauner1-0/+24
The vfs{g,u}id_{gt,lt}_* helpers are currently not needed outside of ima and we shouldn't incentivize people to use them by placing them into the header. Let's just define them locally in the one file in ima where they are used. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-11-02ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()GUO Zihua1-9/+32
IMA relies on the blocking LSM policy notifier callback to update the LSM based IMA policy rules. When SELinux update its policies, IMA would be notified and starts updating all its lsm rules one-by-one. During this time, -ESTALE would be returned by ima_filter_rule_match() if it is called with a LSM rule that has not yet been updated. In ima_match_rules(), -ESTALE is not handled, and the LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. Fix it by re-initializing a temporary rule if -ESTALE is returned by ima_filter_rule_match(). The origin rule in the rule list would be updated by the LSM policy notifier callback. Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier") Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-11-02ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_ruleGUO Zihua1-7/+3
Currently ima_lsm_copy_rule() set the arg_p field of the source rule to NULL, so that the source rule could be freed afterward. It does not make sense for this behavior to be inside a "copy" function. So move it outside and let the caller handle this field. ima_lsm_copy_rule() now produce a shallow copy of the original entry including args_p field. Meaning only the lsm.rule and the rule itself should be freed for the original rule. Thus, instead of calling ima_lsm_free_rule() which frees lsm.rule as well as args_p field, free the lsm.rule directly. Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-10-26ima: use type safe idmapping helpersChristian Brauner1-16/+18
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining places so we can remove all the old helpers. This is a non-functional change. Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-07-20lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policyEric Snowberg1-0/+4
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to the kernel command line; then: $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-05ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signaturesMimi Zohar1-8/+38
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the 'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data - hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature. In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest. The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how" the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed, the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option. appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3] where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default), where 'modsig' is an appended signature, where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA default, by first specifying the digest type: digest_type:= [verity] The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-05-05ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement listMimi Zohar1-1/+37
Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option. To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2 template. The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-03-21Merge tag 'integrity-v5.18' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "Except for extending the 'encrypted' key type to support user provided data, the rest is code cleanup, __setup() usage bug fix, and a trivial change" * tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: MAINTAINERS: add missing security/integrity/platform_certs EVM: fix the evm= __setup handler return value KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions MAINTAINERS: add missing "security/integrity" directory ima: Fix trivial typos in the comments
2022-03-21Merge tag 'for-5.18/block-2022-03-18' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds1-1/+0
Pull block updates from Jens Axboe: - BFQ cleanups and fixes (Yu, Zhang, Yahu, Paolo) - blk-rq-qos completion fix (Tejun) - blk-cgroup merge fix (Tejun) - Add offline error return value to distinguish it from an IO error on the device (Song) - IO stats fixes (Zhang, Christoph) - blkcg refcount fixes (Ming, Yu) - Fix for indefinite dispatch loop softlockup (Shin'ichiro) - blk-mq hardware queue management improvements (Ming) - sbitmap dead code removal (Ming, John) - Plugging merge improvements (me) - Show blk-crypto capabilities in sysfs (Eric) - Multiple delayed queue run improvement (David) - Block throttling fixes (Ming) - Start deprecating auto module loading based on dev_t (Christoph) - bio allocation improvements (Christoph, Chaitanya) - Get rid of bio_devname (Christoph) - bio clone improvements (Christoph) - Block plugging improvements (Christoph) - Get rid of genhd.h header (Christoph) - Ensure drivers use appropriate flush helpers (Christoph) - Refcounting improvements (Christoph) - Queue initialization and teardown improvements (Ming, Christoph) - Misc fixes/improvements (Barry, Chaitanya, Colin, Dan, Jiapeng, Lukas, Nian, Yang, Eric, Chengming) * tag 'for-5.18/block-2022-03-18' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (127 commits) block: cancel all throttled bios in del_gendisk() block: let blkcg_gq grab request queue's refcnt block: avoid use-after-free on throttle data block: limit request dispatch loop duration block/bfq-iosched: Fix spelling mistake "tenative" -> "tentative" sr: simplify the local variable initialization in sr_block_open() block: don't merge across cgroup boundaries if blkcg is enabled block: fix rq-qos breakage from skipping rq_qos_done_bio() block: flush plug based on hardware and software queue order block: ensure plug merging checks the correct queue at least once block: move rq_qos_exit() into disk_release() block: do more work in elevator_exit block: move blk_exit_queue into disk_release block: move q_usage_counter release into blk_queue_release block: don't remove hctx debugfs dir from blk_mq_exit_queue block: move blkcg initialization/destroy into disk allocation/release handler sr: implement ->free_disk to simplify refcounting sd: implement ->free_disk to simplify refcounting sd: delay calling free_opal_dev sd: call sd_zbc_release_disk before releasing the scsi_device reference ...
2022-02-15ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGSMimi Zohar1-1/+1
Simple policy rule options, such as fowner, uid, or euid, can be checked immediately, while other policy rule options, such as requiring a file signature, need to be deferred. The 'flags' field in the integrity_iint_cache struct contains the policy action', 'subaction', and non action/subaction. action: measure/measured, appraise/appraised, (collect)/collected, audit/audited subaction: appraise status for each hook (e.g. file, mmap, bprm, read, creds) non action/subaction: deferred policy rule options and state Rename the IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS. Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-02-15ima: Fix trivial typos in the commentsAustin Kim1-1/+1
There are a few minor typos in the comments. Fix these. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-02-02ima: Do not print policy rule with inactive LSM labelsStefan Berger1-0/+8
Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-02-02block: remove genhd.hChristoph Hellwig1-1/+0
There is no good reason to keep genhd.h separate from the main blkdev.h header that includes it. So fold the contents of genhd.h into blkdev.h and remove genhd.h entirely. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220124093913.742411-4-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-10-09ima: Use strscpy instead of strlcpyPetr Vorel1-1/+1
strlcpy is deprecated, use its safer replacement. Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-10-09ima_policy: Remove duplicate 'the' in docs commentPetr Vorel1-2/+1
Also join string (short enough to be on single line). Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-10-09ima: add gid supportCurtis Veit1-27/+174
IMA currently supports the concept of rules based on uid where the rule is based on the uid of the file owner or the uid of the user accessing the file. Provide the ability to have similar rules based on gid. Signed-off-by: Curtis Veit <veit@vpieng.com> Co-developed-by: Alex Henrie <alexh@vpitech.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Henrie <alexh@vpitech.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-10-09ima: fix uid code style problemsAlex Henrie1-4/+6
scripts/checkpatch.pl wants function arguments to have names; and Mimi prefers to keep the line length in functions to 80 characters or less. Signed-off-by: Alex Henrie <alexh@vpitech.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-10-09ima: fix deadlock when traversing "ima_default_rules".liqiong1-9/+18
The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules" that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules" instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible. Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu(). When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to "&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules) stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup and RCU stalls. Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks. Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong@nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Fixes: 38d859f991f3 ("IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Fix sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression.) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-08-16