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Commit 94dfc73e7cf4 ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with
flexible-array members") broke the userspace API for C++.
These structures ending in VLAs are typically a *header*, which can be
followed by an arbitrary number of entries. Userspace typically creates
a larger structure with some non-zero number of entries, for example in
QEMU's kvm_arch_get_supported_msr_feature():
struct {
struct kvm_msrs info;
struct kvm_msr_entry entries[1];
} msr_data = {};
While that works in C, it fails in C++ with an error like:
flexible array member 'kvm_msrs::entries' not at end of 'struct msr_data'
Fix this by using __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for the VLA, which uses [0]
for C++ compilation.
Fixes: 94dfc73e7cf4 ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with flexible-array members")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3abaf6aefd6e5efeff3b860ac38421d9dec908db.camel@infradead.org
[sean: tag for stable@]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add KVM_X86_QUIRK_VMCS12_ALLOW_FREEZE_IN_SMM to allow L1 to set
FREEZE_IN_SMM in vmcs12's GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL field, as permitted
prior to commit 6b1dd26544d0 ("KVM: VMX: Preserve host's
DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest"). Enable the quirk
by default for backwards compatibility (like all quirks); userspace
can disable it via KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2 for consistency with the
constraints on WRMSR(IA32_DEBUGCTL).
Note that the quirk only bypasses the consistency check. The vmcs02 bit is
still owned by the host, and PMCs are not frozen during virtualized SMM.
In particular, if a host administrator decides that PMCs should not be
frozen during physical SMM, then L1 has no say in the matter.
Fixes: 095686e6fcb4 ("KVM: nVMX: Check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested VM-Enter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205231537.1278753-1-jmattson@google.com
[sean: tag for stable@, clean-up and fix goofs in the comment and docs]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[Rename quirk. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Loongarch:
- Add more CPUCFG mask bits
- Improve feature detection
- Add lazy load support for FPU and binary translation (LBT) register
state
- Fix return value for memory reads from and writes to in-kernel
devices
- Add support for detecting preemption from within a guest
- Add KVM steal time test case to tools/selftests
ARM:
- Add support for FEAT_IDST, allowing ID registers that are not
implemented to be reported as a normal trap rather than as an UNDEF
exception
- Add sanitisation of the VTCR_EL2 register, fixing a number of
UXN/PXN/XN bugs in the process
- Full handling of RESx bits, instead of only RES0, and resulting in
SCTLR_EL2 being added to the list of sanitised registers
- More pKVM fixes for features that are not supposed to be exposed to
guests
- Make sure that MTE being disabled on the pKVM host doesn't give it
the ability to attack the hypervisor
- Allow pKVM's host stage-2 mappings to use the Force Write Back
version of the memory attributes by using the "pass-through'
encoding
- Fix trapping of ICC_DIR_EL1 on GICv5 hosts emulating GICv3 for the
guest
- Preliminary work for guest GICv5 support
- A bunch of debugfs fixes, removing pointless custom iterators
stored in guest data structures
- A small set of FPSIMD cleanups
- Selftest fixes addressing the incorrect alignment of page
allocation
- Other assorted low-impact fixes and spelling fixes
RISC-V:
- Fixes for issues discoverd by KVM API fuzzing in
kvm_riscv_aia_imsic_has_attr(), kvm_riscv_aia_imsic_rw_attr(), and
kvm_riscv_vcpu_aia_imsic_update()
- Allow Zalasr, Zilsd and Zclsd extensions for Guest/VM
- Transparent huge page support for hypervisor page tables
- Adjust the number of available guest irq files based on MMIO
register sizes found in the device tree or the ACPI tables
- Add RISC-V specific paging modes to KVM selftests
- Detect paging mode at runtime for selftests
s390:
- Performance improvement for vSIE (aka nested virtualization)
- Completely new memory management. s390 was a special snowflake that
enlisted help from the architecture's page table management to
build hypervisor page tables, in particular enabling sharing the
last level of page tables. This however was a lot of code (~3K
lines) in order to support KVM, and also blocked several features.
The biggest advantages is that the page size of userspace is
completely independent of the page size used by the guest:
userspace can mix normal pages, THPs and hugetlbfs as it sees fit,
and in fact transparent hugepages were not possible before. It's
also now possible to have nested guests and guests with huge pages
running on the same host
- Maintainership change for s390 vfio-pci
- Small quality of life improvement for protected guests
x86:
- Add support for giving the guest full ownership of PMU hardware
(contexted switched around the fastpath run loop) and allowing
direct access to data MSRs and PMCs (restricted by the vPMU model).
KVM still intercepts access to control registers, e.g. to enforce
event filtering and to prevent the guest from profiling sensitive
host state. This is more accurate, since it has no risk of
contention and thus dropped events, and also has significantly less
overhead.
For more information, see the commit message for merge commit
bf2c3138ae36 ("Merge tag 'kvm-x86-pmu-6.20' ...")
- Disallow changing the virtual CPU model if L2 is active, for all
the same reasons KVM disallows change the model after the first
KVM_RUN
- Fix a bug where KVM would incorrectly reject host accesses to PV
MSRs when running with KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID enabled,
even if those were advertised as supported to userspace,
- Fix a bug with protected guest state (SEV-ES/SNP and TDX) VMs,
where KVM would attempt to read CR3 configuring an async #PF entry
- Fail the build if EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL or EXPORT_SYMBOL is used in KVM
(for x86 only) to enforce usage of EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL.
Only a few exports that are intended for external usage, and those
are allowed explicitly
- When checking nested events after a vCPU is unblocked, ignore
-EBUSY instead of WARNing. Userspace can sometimes put the vCPU
into what should be an impossible state, and spurious exit to
userspace on -EBUSY does not really do anything to solve the issue
- Also throw in the towel and drop the WARN on INIT/SIPI being
blocked when vCPU is in Wait-For-SIPI, which also resulted in
playing whack-a-mole with syzkaller stuffing architecturally
impossible states into KVM
- Add support for new Intel instructions that don't require anything
beyond enumerating feature flags to userspace
- Grab SRCU when reading PDPTRs in KVM_GET_SREGS2
- Add WARNs to guard against modifying KVM's CPU caps outside of the
intended setup flow, as nested VMX in particular is sensitive to
unexpected changes in KVM's golden configuration
- Add a quirk to allow userspace to opt-in to actually suppress EOI
broadcasts when the suppression feature is enabled by the guest
(currently limited to split IRQCHIP, i.e. userspace I/O APIC).
Sadly, simply fixing KVM to honor Suppress EOI Broadcasts isn't an
option as some userspaces have come to rely on KVM's buggy behavior
(KVM advertises Supress EOI Broadcast irrespective of whether or
not userspace I/O APIC supports Directed EOIs)
- Clean up KVM's handling of marking mapped vCPU pages dirty
- Drop a pile of *ancient* sanity checks hidden behind in KVM's
unused ASSERT() macro, most of which could be trivially triggered
by the guest and/or user, and all of which were useless
- Fold "struct dest_map" into its sole user, "struct rtc_status", to
make it more obvious what the weird parameter is used for, and to
allow fropping these RTC shenanigans if CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC=n
- Bury all of ioapic.h, i8254.h and related ioctls (including
KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP) behind CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC=y
- Add a regression test for recent APICv update fixes
- Handle "hardware APIC ISR", a.k.a. SVI, updates in
kvm_apic_update_apicv() to consolidate the updates, and to
co-locate SVI updates with the updates for KVM's own cache of ISR
information
- Drop a dead function declaration
- Minor cleanups
x86 (Intel):
- Rework KVM's handling of VMCS updates while L2 is active to
temporarily switch to vmcs01 instead of deferring the update until
the next nested VM-Exit.
The deferred updates approach directly contributed to several bugs,
was proving to be a maintenance burden due to the difficulty in
auditing the correctness of deferred updates, and was polluting
"struct nested_vmx" with a growing pile of booleans
- Fix an SGX bug where KVM would incorrectly try to handle EPCM page
faults, and instead always reflect them into the guest. Since KVM
doesn't shadow EPCM entries, EPCM violations cannot be due to KVM
interference and can't be resolved by KVM
- Fix a bug where KVM would register its posted interrupt wakeup
handler even if loading kvm-intel.ko ultimately failed
- Disallow access to vmcb12 fields that aren't fully supported,
mostly to avoid weirdness and complexity for FRED and other
features, where KVM wants enable VMCS shadowing for fields that
conditionally exist
- Print out the "bad" offsets and values if kvm-intel.ko refuses to
load (or refuses to online a CPU) due to a VMCS config mismatch
x86 (AMD):
- Drop a user-triggerable WARN on nested_svm_load_cr3() failure
- Add support for virtualizing ERAPS. Note, correct virtualization of
ERAPS relies on an upcoming, publicly announced change in the APM
to reduce the set of conditions where hardware (i.e. KVM) *must*
flush the RAP
- Ignore nSVM intercepts for instructions that are not supported
according to L1's virtual CPU model
- Add support for expedited writes to the fast MMIO bus, a la VMX's
fastpath for EPT Misconfig
- Don't set GIF when clearing EFER.SVME, as GIF exists independently
of SVM, and allow userspace to restore nested state with GIF=0
- Treat exit_code as an unsigned 64-bit value through all of KVM
- Add support for fetching SNP certificates from userspace
- Fix a bug where KVM would use vmcb02 instead of vmcb01 when
emulating VMLOAD or VMSAVE on behalf of L2
- Misc fixes and cleanups
x86 selftests:
- Add a regression test for TPR<=>CR8 synchronization and IRQ masking
- Overhaul selftest's MMU infrastructure to genericize stage-2 MMU
support, and extend x86's infrastructure to support EPT and NPT
(for L2 guests)
- Extend several nested VMX tests to also cover nested SVM
- Add a selftest for nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE
- Rework the nested dirty log test, originally added as a regression
test for PML where KVM logged L2 GPAs instead of L1 GPAs, to
improve test coverage and to hopefully make the test easier to
understand and maintain
guest_memfd:
- Remove kvm_gmem_populate()'s preparation tracking and half-baked
hugepage handling. SEV/SNP was the only user of the tracking and it
can do it via the RMP
- Retroactively document and enforce (for SNP) that
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE and KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION require the
source page to be 4KiB aligned, to avoid non-trivial complexity for
something that no known VMM seems to be doing and to avoid an API
special case for in-place conversion, which simply can't support
unaligned sources
- When populating guest_memfd memory, GUP the source page in common
code and pass the refcounted page to the vendor callback, instead
of letting vendor code do the heavy lifting. Doing so avoids a
looming deadlock bug with in-place due an AB-BA conflict betwee
mmap_lock and guest_memfd's filemap invalidate lock
Generic:
- Fix a bug where KVM would ignore the vCPU's selected address space
when creating a vCPU-specific mapping of guest memory. Actually
this bug could not be hit even on x86, the only architecture with
multiple address spaces, but it's a bug nevertheless"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (267 commits)
KVM: s390: Increase permitted SE header size to 1 MiB
MAINTAINERS: Replace backup for s390 vfio-pci
KVM: s390: vsie: Fix race in acquire_gmap_shadow()
KVM: s390: vsie: Fix race in walk_guest_tables()
KVM: s390: Use guest address to mark guest page dirty
irqchip/riscv-imsic: Adjust the number of available guest irq files
RISC-V: KVM: Transparent huge page support
RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add Zalasr extensions to get-reg-list test
RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zalasr extensions for Guest/VM
KVM: riscv: selftests: Add riscv vm satp modes
KVM: riscv: selftests: add Zilsd and Zclsd extension to get-reg-list test
riscv: KVM: allow Zilsd and Zclsd extensions for Guest/VM
RISC-V: KVM: Skip IMSIC update if vCPU IMSIC state is not initialized
RISC-V: KVM: Fix null pointer dereference in kvm_riscv_aia_imsic_rw_attr()
RISC-V: KVM: Fix null pointer dereference in kvm_riscv_aia_imsic_has_attr()
RISC-V: KVM: Remove unnecessary 'ret' assignment
KVM: s390: Add explicit padding to struct kvm_s390_keyop
KVM: LoongArch: selftests: Add steal time test case
LoongArch: KVM: Add paravirt vcpu_is_preempted() support in guest side
LoongArch: KVM: Add paravirt preempt feature in hypervisor side
...
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KVM x86 misc changes for 6.20
- Disallow changing the virtual CPU model if L2 is active, for all the same
reasons KVM disallows change the model after the first KVM_RUN.
- Fix a bug where KVM would incorrectly reject host accesses to PV MSRs that
were advertised as supported to userspace when running with
KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID enabled.
- Fix a bug where KVM would attempt to read protect guest state (CR3) when
configuring an async #PF entry.
- Fail the build if EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL or EXPORT_SYMBOL is used in KVM (for x86
only) to enforce usage of EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL. Explicitly allow
the few exports that are intended for external usage.
- Ignore -EBUSY when checking nested events after a vCPU exits blocking as
the WARN is user-triggerable, and because exiting to userspace on -EBUSY
does more harm than good in pretty much every situation.
- Throw in the towel and drop the WARN on INIT/SIPI being blocked when vCPU is
in Wait-For-SIPI, as playing whack-a-mole with syzkaller turned out to be an
unwinnable game.
- Add support for new Intel instructions that don't require anything beyond
enumerating feature flags to userspace.
- Grab SRCU when reading PDPTRs in KVM_GET_SREGS2.
- Add WARNs to guard against modifying KVM's CPU caps outside of the intended
setup flow, as nested VMX in particular is sensitive to unexpected changes
in KVM's golden configuration.
- Add a quirk to allow userspace to opt-in to actually suppress EOI broadcasts
when the suppression feature is enabled by the guest (currently limited to
split IRQCHIP, i.e. userspace I/O APIC). Sadly, simply fixing KVM to honor
Suppress EOI Broadcasts isn't an option as some userspaces have come to rely
on KVM's buggy behavior (KVM advertises Supress EOI Broadcast irrespective
of whether or not userspace I/O APIC supports Directed EOIs).
- Minor cleanups.
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Add two flags for KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API to allow userspace to control support
for Suppress EOI Broadcasts when using a split IRQCHIP (I/O APIC emulated
by userspace), which KVM completely mishandles. When x2APIC support was
first added, KVM incorrectly advertised and "enabled" Suppress EOI
Broadcast, without fully supporting the I/O APIC side of the equation,
i.e. without adding directed EOI to KVM's in-kernel I/O APIC.
That flaw was carried over to split IRQCHIP support, i.e. KVM advertised
support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts irrespective of whether or not the
userspace I/O APIC implementation supported directed EOIs. Even worse,
KVM didn't actually suppress EOI broadcasts, i.e. userspace VMMs without
support for directed EOI came to rely on the "spurious" broadcasts.
KVM "fixed" the in-kernel I/O APIC implementation by completely disabling
support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts in commit 0bcc3fb95b97 ("KVM: lapic:
stop advertising DIRECTED_EOI when in-kernel IOAPIC is in use"), but
didn't do anything to remedy userspace I/O APIC implementations.
KVM's bogus handling of Suppress EOI Broadcast is problematic when the
guest relies on interrupts being masked in the I/O APIC until well after
the initial local APIC EOI. E.g. Windows with Credential Guard enabled
handles interrupts in the following order:
1. Interrupt for L2 arrives.
2. L1 APIC EOIs the interrupt.
3. L1 resumes L2 and injects the interrupt.
4. L2 EOIs after servicing.
5. L1 performs the I/O APIC EOI.
Because KVM EOIs the I/O APIC at step #2, the guest can get an interrupt
storm, e.g. if the IRQ line is still asserted and userspace reacts to the
EOI by re-injecting the IRQ, because the guest doesn't de-assert the line
until step #4, and doesn't expect the interrupt to be re-enabled until
step #5.
Unfortunately, simply "fixing" the bug isn't an option, as KVM has no way
of knowing if the userspace I/O APIC supports directed EOIs, i.e.
suppressing EOI broadcasts would result in interrupts being stuck masked
in the userspace I/O APIC due to step #5 being ignored by userspace. And
fully disabling support for Suppress EOI Broadcast is also undesirable, as
picking up the fix would require a guest reboot, *and* more importantly
would change the virtual CPU model exposed to the guest without any buy-in
from userspace.
Add KVM_X2APIC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST and
KVM_X2APIC_DISABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST flags to allow userspace to
explicitly enable or disable support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts. This
gives userspace control over the virtual CPU model exposed to the guest,
as KVM should never have enabled support for Suppress EOI Broadcast without
userspace opt-in. Not setting either flag will result in legacy quirky
behavior for backward compatibility.
Disallow fully enabling SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST when using an in-kernel
I/O APIC, as KVM's history/support is just as tragic. E.g. it's not clear
that commit c806a6ad35bf ("KVM: x86: call irq notifiers with directed EOI")
was entirely correct, i.e. it may have simply papered over the lack of
Directed EOI emulation in the I/O APIC.
Note, Suppress EOI Broadcasts is defined only in Intel's SDM, not in AMD's
APM. But the bit is writable on some AMD CPUs, e.g. Turin, and KVM's ABI
is to support Directed EOI (KVM's name) irrespective of guest CPU vendor.
Fixes: 7543a635aa09 ("KVM: x86: Add KVM exit for IOAPIC EOIs")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/7D497EF1-607D-4D37-98E7-DAF95F099342@nutanix.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Khushit Shah <khushit.shah@nutanix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123125657.3384063-1-khushit.shah@nutanix.com
[sean: clean up minor formatting goofs and fix a comment typo]
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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UAPI headers are not supposed to leak references to kconfig symbols.
These won't be set when building userspace. Hide the kconfig reference
behind 'if defined(__KERNEL__)', so it will be stripped by
headers_install.sh. The result for userspace will be the same, but the
exceptions in headers_install.sh can also be removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Introduce a new command for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl that can be used
to enable fetching of endorsement key certificates from userspace via
the new KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS exit type. Also introduce a new
KVM_X86_SEV_SNP_REQ_CERTS KVM device attribute so that userspace can
query whether the kernel supports the new command/exit.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109231732.1160759-3-michael.roth@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Fix KVM's long-standing buggy handling of SVM's exit_code as a 32-bit
value. Per the APM and Xen commit d1bd157fbc ("Big merge the HVM
full-virtualisation abstractions.") (which is arguably more trustworthy
than KVM), offset 0x70 is a single 64-bit value:
070h 63:0 EXITCODE
Track exit_code as a single u64 to prevent reintroducing bugs where KVM
neglects to correctly set bits 63:32.
Fixes: 6aa8b732ca01 ("[PATCH] kvm: userspace interface")
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251230211347.4099600-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Support for userspace handling of synchronous external aborts
(SEAs), allowing the VMM to potentially handle the abort in a
non-fatal manner
- Large rework of the VGIC's list register handling with the goal of
supporting more active/pending IRQs than available list registers
in hardware. In addition, the VGIC now supports EOImode==1 style
deactivations for IRQs which may occur on a separate vCPU than the
one that acked the IRQ
- Support for FEAT_XNX (user / privileged execute permissions) and
FEAT_HAF (hardware update to the Access Flag) in the software page
table walkers and shadow MMU
- Allow page table destruction to reschedule, fixing long
need_resched latencies observed when destroying a large VM
- Minor fixes to KVM and selftests
Loongarch:
- Get VM PMU capability from HW GCFG register
- Add AVEC basic support
- Use 64-bit register definition for EIOINTC
- Add KVM timer test cases for tools/selftests
RISC/V:
- SBI message passing (MPXY) support for KVM guest
- Give a new, more specific error subcode for the case when in-kernel
AIA virtualization fails to allocate IMSIC VS-file
- Support KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET, enabling dirty log gradually
in small chunks
- Fix guest page fault within HLV* instructions
- Flush VS-stage TLB after VCPU migration for Andes cores
s390:
- Always allocate ESCA (Extended System Control Area), instead of
starting with the basic SCA and converting to ESCA with the
addition of the 65th vCPU. The price is increased number of exits
(and worse performance) on z10 and earlier processor; ESCA was
introduced by z114/z196 in 2010
- VIRT_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK support
- Operation exception forwarding support
- Cleanups
x86:
- Skip the costly "zap all SPTEs" on an MMIO generation wrap if MMIO
SPTE caching is disabled, as there can't be any relevant SPTEs to
zap
- Relocate a misplaced export
- Fix an async #PF bug where KVM would clear the completion queue
when the guest transitioned in and out of paging mode, e.g. when
handling an SMI and then returning to paged mode via RSM
- Leave KVM's user-return notifier registered even when disabling
virtualization, as long as kvm.ko is loaded. On reboot/shutdown,
keeping the notifier registered is ok; the kernel does not use the
MSRs and the callback will run cleanly and restore host MSRs if the
CPU manages to return to userspace before the system goes down
- Use the checked version of {get,put}_user()
- Fix a long-lurking bug where KVM's lack of catch-up logic for
periodic APIC timers can result in a hard lockup in the host
- Revert the periodic kvmclock sync logic now that KVM doesn't use a
clocksource that's subject to NTP corrections
- Clean up KVM's handling of MMIO Stale Data and L1TF, and bury the
latter behind CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS
- Context switch XCR0, XSS, and PKRU outside of the entry/exit fast
path; the only reason they were handled in the fast path was to
paper of a bug in the core #MC code, and that has long since been
fixed
- Add emulator support for AVX MOV instructions, to play nice with
emulated devices whose guest drivers like to access PCI BARs with
large multi-byte instructions
x86 (AMD):
- Fix a few missing "VMCB dirty" bugs
- Fix the worst of KVM's lack of EFER.LMSLE emulation
- Add AVIC support for addressing 4k vCPUs in x2AVIC mode
- Fix incorrect handling of selective CR0 writes when checking
intercepts during emulation of L2 instructions
- Fix a currently-benign bug where KVM would clobber SPEC_CTRL[63:32]
on VMRUN and #VMEXIT
- Fix a bug where KVM corrupt the guest code stream when re-injecting
a soft interrupt if the guest patched the underlying code after the
VM-Exit, e.g. when Linux patches code with a temporary INT3
- Add KVM_X86_SNP_POLICY_BITS to advertise supported SNP policy bits
to userspace, and extend KVM "support" to all policy bits that
don't require any actual support from KVM
x86 (Intel):
- Use the root role from kvm_mmu_page to construct EPTPs instead of
the current vCPU state, partly as worthwhile cleanup, but mostly to
pave the way for tracking per-root TLB flushes, and elide EPT
flushes on pCPU migration if the root is clean from a previous
flush
- Add a few missing nested consistency checks
- Rip out support for doing "early" consistency checks via hardware
as the functionality hasn't been used in years and is no longer
useful in general; replace it with an off-by-default module param
to WARN if hardware fails a check that KVM does not perform
- Fix a currently-benign bug where KVM would drop the guest's
SPEC_CTRL[63:32] on VM-Enter
- Misc cleanups
- Overhaul the TDX code to address systemic races where KVM (acting
on behalf of userspace) could inadvertantly trigger lock contention
in the TDX-Module; KVM was either working around these in weird,
ugly ways, or was simply oblivious to them (though even Yan's
devilish selftests could only break individual VMs, not the host
kernel)
- Fix a bug where KVM could corrupt a vCPU's cpu_list when freeing a
TDX vCPU, if creating said vCPU failed partway through
- Fix a few sparse warnings (bad annotation, 0 != NULL)
- Use struct_size() to simplify copying TDX capabilities to userspace
- Fix a bug where TDX would effectively corrupt user-return MSR
values if the TDX Module rejects VP.ENTER and thus doesn't clobber
host MSRs as expected
Selftests:
- Fix a math goof in mmu_stress_test when running on a single-CPU
system/VM
- Forcefully override ARCH from x86_64 to x86 to play nice with
specifying ARCH=x86_64 on the command line
- Extend a bunch of nested VMX to validate nested SVM as well
- Add support for LA57 in the core VM_MODE_xxx macro, and add a test
to verify KVM can save/restore nested VMX state when L1 is using
5-level paging, but L2 is not
- Clean up the guest paging code in anticipation of sharing the core
logic for nested EPT and nested NPT
guest_memfd:
- Add NUMA mempolicy support for guest_memfd, and clean up a variety
of rough edges in guest_memfd along the way
- Define a CLASS to automatically handle get+put when grabbing a
guest_memfd from a memslot to make it harder to leak references
- Enhance KVM selftests to make it easer to develop and debug
selftests like those added for guest_memfd NUMA support, e.g. where
test and/or KVM bugs often result in hard-to-debug SIGBUS errors
- Misc cleanups
Generic:
- Use the recently-added WQ_PERCPU when creating the per-CPU
workqueue for irqfd cleanup
- Fix a goof in the dirty ring documentation
- Fix choice of target for directed yield across different calls to
kvm_vcpu_on_spin(); the function was always starting from the first
vCPU instead of continuing the round-robin search"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (260 commits)
KVM: arm64: at: Update AF on software walk only if VM has FEAT_HAFDBS
KVM: arm64: at: Use correct HA bit in TCR_EL2 when regime is EL2
KVM: arm64: Document KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_{UX,PX}
KVM: arm64: Fix spelling mistake "Unexpeced" -> "Unexpected"
KVM: arm64: Add break to default case in kvm_pgtable_stage2_pte_prot()
KVM: arm64: Add endian casting to kvm_swap_s[12]_desc()
KVM: arm64: Fix compilation when CONFIG_ARM64_USE_LSE_ATOMICS=n
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add test for AT emulation
KVM: arm64: nv: Expose hardware access flag management to NV guests
KVM: arm64: nv: Implement HW access flag management in stage-2 SW PTW
KVM: arm64: Implement HW access flag management in stage-1 SW PTW
KVM: arm64: Propagate PTW errors up to AT emulation
KVM: arm64: Add helper for swapping guest descriptor
KVM: arm64: nv: Use pgtable definitions in stage-2 walk
KVM: arm64: Handle endianness in read helper for emulated PTW
KVM: arm64: nv: Stop passing vCPU through void ptr in S2 PTW
KVM: arm64: Call helper for reading descriptors directly
KVM: arm64: nv: Advertise support for FEAT_XNX
KVM: arm64: Teach ptdump about FEAT_XNX permissions
KVM: s390: Use generic VIRT_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK functions
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU feature updates from Dave Hansen:
"The biggest thing of note here is Linear Address Space Separation
(LASS). It represents the first time I can think of that the
upper=>kernel/lower=>user address space convention is actually
recognized by the hardware on x86. It ensures that userspace can not
even get the hardware to _start_ page walks for the kernel address
space. This, of course, is a really nice generic side channel defense.
This is really only a down payment on LASS support. There are still
some details to work out in its interaction with EFI calls and
vsyscall emulation. For now, LASS is disabled if either of those
features is compiled in (which is almost always the case).
There's also one straggler commit in here which converts an
under-utilized AMD CPU feature leaf into a generic Linux-defined leaf
so more feature can be packed in there.
Summary:
- Enable Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
- Change X86_FEATURE leaf 17 from an AMD leaf to Linux-defined"
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization
selftests/x86: Update the negative vsyscall tests to expect a #GP
x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message
x86/kexec: Disable LASS during relocate kernel
x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel code
x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset
x86/cpu: Add an LASS dependency on SMAP
x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
x86/cpufeatures: Make X86_FEATURE leaf 17 Linux-specific
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SGX updates from Dave HansenL
"The main content here is adding support for the new EUPDATESVN SGX
ISA. Before this, folks who updated microcode had to reboot before
enclaves could attest to the new microcode. The new functionality lets
them do this without a reboot.
The rest are some nice, but relatively mundane comment and kernel-doc
fixups.
Summary:
- Allow security version (SVN) updates so enclaves can attest to new
microcode
- Fix kernel docs typos"
* tag 'x86_sgx_for_6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sgx: Fix a typo in the kernel-doc comment for enum sgx_attribute
x86/sgx: Remove superfluous asterisk from copyright comment in asm/sgx.h
x86/sgx: Document structs and enums with '@', not '%'
x86/sgx: Add kernel-doc descriptions for params passed to vDSO user handler
x86/sgx: Add a missing colon in kernel-doc markup for "struct sgx_enclave_run"
x86/sgx: Enable automatic SVN updates for SGX enclaves
x86/sgx: Implement ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
x86/sgx: Define error codes for use by ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_EUPDATESVN feature flag
x86/sgx: Introduce functions to count the sgx_(vepc_)open()
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KVM SVM changes for 6.19:
- Fix a few missing "VMCB dirty" bugs.
- Fix the worst of KVM's lack of EFER.LMSLE emulation.
- Add AVIC support for addressing 4k vCPUs in x2AVIC mode.
- Fix incorrect handling of selective CR0 writes when checking intercepts
during emulation of L2 instructions.
- Fix a currently-benign bug where KVM would clobber SPEC_CTRL[63:32] on
VMRUN and #VMEXIT.
- Fix a bug where KVM corrupt the guest code stream when re-injecting a soft
interrupt if the guest patched the underlying code after the VM-Exit, e.g.
when Linux patches code with a temporary INT3.
- Add KVM_X86_SNP_POLICY_BITS to advertise supported SNP policy bits to
userspace, and extend KVM "support" to all policy bits that don't require
any actual support from KVM.
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Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is a security feature that
mitigates a class of side-channel attacks relying on speculative access
across the user/kernel boundary.
Privilege mode based access protection already exists today with paging
and features such as SMEP and SMAP. However, to enforce these
protections, the processor must traverse the paging structures in
memory. An attacker can use timing information resulting from this
traversal to determine details about the paging structures, and to
determine the layout of the kernel memory.
LASS provides the same mode-based protections as paging but without
traversing the paging structures. Because the protections are enforced
prior to page-walks, an attacker will not be able to derive paging-based
timing information from the various caching structures such as the TLBs,
mid-level caches, page walker, data caches, etc.
LASS enforcement relies on the kernel implementation to divide the
64-bit virtual address space into two halves:
Addr[63]=0 -> User address space
Addr[63]=1 -> Kernel address space
Any data access or code execution across address spaces typically
results in a #GP fault, with an #SS generated in some rare cases. The
LASS enforcement for kernel data accesses is dependent on CR4.SMAP being
set. The enforcement can be disabled by toggling the RFLAGS.AC bit
similar to SMAP.
Define the CPU feature bits to enumerate LASS. Also, disable the feature
at compile time on 32-bit kernels. Use a direct dependency on X86_32
(instead of !X86_64) to make it easier to combine with similar 32-bit
specific dependencies in the future.
LASS mitigates a class of side-channel speculative attacks, such as
Spectre LAM, described in the paper, "Leaky Address Masking: Exploiting
Unmasked Spectre Gadgets with Noncanonical Address Translation".
Add the "lass" flag to /proc/cpuinfo to indicate that the feature is
supported by hardware and enabled by the kernel. This allows userspace
to determine if the system is secure against such attacks.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118182911.2983253-2-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
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Use '@' to document structure members and enum values in kernel-doc markup,
as per Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst and flagged by make htmldocs.
WARNING: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:17 Enum value 'SGX_PAGE_MEASURE'
not described in enum 'sgx_page_flags'
Opportunistically add a missing ':' for SGX_CHILD_PRESENT.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251106145506.145fc620@canb.auug.org.au
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112160708.1343355-4-seanjc%40google.com
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Add kernel-doc markup for the register parameters passed by the vDSO blob
to the user handler to suppress build warnings, e.g.
WARNING: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:157 function parameter 'r8' not
described in 'sgx_enclave_user_handler_t'
Call out that except for RSP, the registers are undefined on asynchronous
exits as far as the vDSO ABI is concerned. E.g. the vDSO's exception
handler clobbers RDX, RDI, and RSI, and the kernel doesn't guarantee that
R8 or R9 will be zero (the synthetic value loaded by the CPU).
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251106145506.145fc620@canb.auug.org.au
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112160708.1343355-3-seanjc%40google.com
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Add a missing ':' for the description of sgx_enclave_run.reserved so that
documentation for the member is correctly generated:
WARNING: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:184 struct member 'reserved' not
described in 'sgx_enclave_run'
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251106145506.145fc620@canb.auug.org.au
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112160708.1343355-2-seanjc%40google.com
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Define the set of policy bits that KVM currently knows as not requiring
any implementation support within KVM. Provide this value to userspace
via the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c596f7529518f3f826a57970029451d9385949e5.1761593632.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD
guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL
is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate
a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel.
Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and
SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX
non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a
nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can
crash itself, but not L1.
Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's
pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit,
but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0
check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks).
Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before
the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode.
Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode
that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM"
specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long-
form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when
executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the
TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as
documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the
TDX-Module base specification.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Pull x86 kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Generic:
- Rework almost all of KVM's exports to expose symbols only to KVM's
x86 vendor modules (kvm-{amd,intel}.ko and PPC's kvm-{pr,hv}.ko
x86:
- Rework almost all of KVM x86's exports to expose symbols only to
KVM's vendor modules, i.e. to kvm-{amd,intel}.ko
- Add support for virtualizing Control-flow Enforcement Technology
(CET) on Intel (Shadow Stacks and Indirect Branch Tracking) and AMD
(Shadow Stacks).
It is worth noting that while SHSTK and IBT can be enabled
separately in CPUID, it is not really possible to virtualize them
separately. Therefore, Intel processors will really allow both
SHSTK and IBT under the hood if either is made visible in the
guest's CPUID. The alternative would be to intercept
XSAVES/XRSTORS, which is not feasible for performance reasons
- Fix a variety of fuzzing WARNs all caused by checking L1 intercepts
when completing userspace I/O. KVM has already committed to
allowing L2 to to perform I/O at that point
- Emulate PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_SET for PerfMonV2 guests, as the
MSR is supposed to exist for v2 PMUs
- Allow Centaur CPU leaves (base 0xC000_0000) for Zhaoxin CPUs
- Add support for the immediate forms of RDMSR and WRMSRNS, sans full
emulator support (KVM should never need to emulate the MSRs outside
of forced emulation and other contrived testing scenarios)
- Clean up the MSR APIs in preparation for CET and FRED
virtualization, as well as mediated vPMU support
- Clean up a pile of PMU code in anticipation of adding support for
mediated vPMUs
- Reject in-kernel IOAPIC/PIT for TDX VMs, as KVM can't obtain EOI
vmexits needed to faithfully emulate an I/O APIC for such guests
- Many cleanups and minor fixes
- Recover possible NX huge pages within the TDP MMU under read lock
to reduce guest jitter when restoring NX huge pages
- Return -EAGAIN during prefault if userspace concurrently
deletes/moves the relevant memslot, to fix an issue where
prefaulting could deadlock with the memslot update
x86 (AMD):
- Enable AVIC by default for Zen4+ if x2AVIC (and other prereqs) is
supported
- Require a minimum GHCB version of 2 when starting SEV-SNP guests
via KVM_SEV_INIT2 so that invalid GHCB versions result in immediate
errors instead of latent guest failures
- Add support for SEV-SNP's CipherText Hiding, an opt-in feature that
prevents unauthorized CPU accesses from reading the ciphertext of
SNP guest private memory, e.g. to attempt an offline attack. This
feature splits the shared SEV-ES/SEV-SNP ASID space into separate
ranges for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests, therefore a new module
parameter is needed to control the number of ASIDs that can be used
for VMs with CipherText Hiding vs. how many can be used to run
SEV-ES guests
- Add support for Secure TSC for SEV-SNP guests, which prevents the
untrusted host from tampering with the guest's TSC frequency, while
still allowing the the VMM to configure the guest's TSC frequency
prior to launch
- Validate the XCR0 provided by the guest (via the GHCB) to avoid
bugs resulting from bogus XCR0 values
- Save an SEV guest's policy if and only if LAUNCH_START fully
succeeds to avoid leaving behind stale state (thankfully not
consumed in KVM)
- Explicitly reject non-positive effective lengths during SNP's
LAUNCH_UPDATE instead of subtly relying on guest_memfd to deal with
them
- Reload the pre-VMRUN TSC_AUX on #VMEXIT for SEV-ES guests, not the
host's desired TSC_AUX, to fix a bug where KVM was keeping a
different vCPU's TSC_AUX in the host MSR until return to userspace
KVM (Intel):
- Preparation for FRED support
- Don't retry in TDX's anti-zero-step mitigation if the target
memslot is invalid, i.e. is being deleted or moved, to fix a
deadlock scenario similar to the aforementioned prefaulting case
- Misc bugfixes and minor cleanups"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (142 commits)
KVM: x86: Export KVM-internal symbols for sub-modules only
KVM: x86: Drop pointless exports of kvm_arch_xxx() hooks
KVM: x86: Move kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu() to lapic.c
KVM: Export KVM-internal symbols for sub-modules only
KVM: s390/vfio-ap: Use kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot() instead of open coded equivalent
KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit
KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported
KVM: selftests: Add coverage for KVM-defined registers in MSRs test
KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test
KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features
KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test
KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write
KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors
KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector
KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE
KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid
KVM: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate
KVM: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02
...
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Add {HV,CP,SX}_VECTOR definitions for AMD's Hypervisor Injection Exception,
VMM Communication Exception, and SVM Security Exception vectors, along with
human friendly formatting for trace_kvm_inj_exception().
Note, KVM is all but guaranteed to never observe or inject #SX, and #HV is
also unlikely to go unused. Add the architectural collateral mostly for
completeness, and on the off chance that hardware goes off the rails.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-44-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a CP_VECTOR definition for CET's Control Protection Exception (#CP),
along with human friendly formatting for trace_kvm_inj_exception().
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-43-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a KVM-defined ONE_REG register, KVM_REG_GUEST_SSP, to let userspace
save and restore the guest's Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP). On both Intel
and AMD, SSP is a hardware register that can only be accessed by software
via dedicated ISA (e.g. RDSSP) or via VMCS/VMCB fields (used by hardware
to context switch SSP at entry/exit). As a result, SSP doesn't fit in
any of KVM's existing interfaces for saving/restoring state.
Internally, treat SSP as a fake/synthetic MSR, as the semantics of writes
to SSP follow that of several other Shadow Stack MSRs, e.g. the PLx_SSP
MSRs. Use a translation layer to hide the KVM-internal MSR index so that
the arbitrary index doesn't become ABI, e.g. so that KVM can rework its
implementation as needed, so long as the ONE_REG ABI is maintained.
Explicitly reject accesses to SSP if the vCPU doesn't have Shadow Stack
support to avoid running afoul of ignore_msrs, which unfortunately applies
to host-initiated accesses (which is a discussion for another day). I.e.
ensure consistent behavior for KVM-defined registers irrespective of
ignore_msrs.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aca9d389-f11e-4811-90cf-d98e345a5cc2@intel.com
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-14-seanjc@google.com
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Enable KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs so that userspace can access MSRs and
other non-MSR registers through them, along with support for
KVM_GET_REG_LIST to enumerate support for KVM-defined registers.
This is in preparation for allowing userspace to read/write the guest SSP
register, which is needed for the upcoming CET virtualization support.
Currently, two types of registers are supported: KVM_X86_REG_TYPE_MSR and
KVM_X86_REG_TYPE_KVM. All MSRs are in the former type; the latter type is
added for registers that lack existing KVM uAPIs to access them. The "KVM"
in the name is intended to be vague to give KVM flexibility to include
other potential registers. More precise names like "SYNTHETIC" and
"SYNTHETIC_MSR" were considered, but were deemed too confusing (e.g. can
be conflated with synthetic guest-visible MSRs) and may put KVM into a
corne |
